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EARLY VERSIONS AND PRACTICES OF SEPARATION OF
POWERS: A COMMENT
RUSSELL

K. OSGOOD*

It is an honor to be asked to comment on Dean Casper's interesting and thoughtful essay. More needs to be said, however, about
the historical context of separation of powers. This comment has
three parts. The first section is methodological. The second section
involves a brief discussion of several aspects of Massachusetts constitutional history and its Constitution of 1780. The third section
discusses the peculiar problems of drawing any conclusion, even an
oblique one, about separation of powers from an early episode involving a foreign relations or war powers issue.
I.
No one needs to be reminded of the difficulties inherent in using
selected episodes in constitutional history as a basis for reaching a
major conclusion about the meaning of the text of the federal Constitution of 1787. Casper is, therefore, appropriately cautious about
the significance of his essay. Nevertheless, because we are charmed
and interested by his fascinating stories, we run the risk of being
influenced too much by the message that separation of powers
ideas were indistinct and relatively insignificant. In the aggregate,
the events Casper presents overly deemphasize separation of powers notions. To support this point, I will focus specifically on the
context of the early constitutional period.
The period after the adoption of the federal Constitution of
1787, from which most of Casper's examples are drawn, was a period dominated by the politically anesthetizing presence and influence of George Washington. While Washington magisterially presided over the newly formed government, the civil order was not
totally secure or immune from fears of foreign or domestic chal*Dean and Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
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lenges and disruptions. Indeed, as Casper notes,' many believed
that the British were behind the Algerine pirates.
The dominance of the "Father of the Country," the fear of foreign threats, and the natural human desire to work together cooperatively in the early phase of any human endeavor explain a fair
amount of what Casper describes. These episodes do not likely
shed much light on the unspecified doctrines of separated and
shared powers set out or implicitly adopted in the Constitution of
1787. My methodological point, therefore, is that an analysis of
separation of powers that is based on early practice after the adoption of the Constitution is particularly difficult because of the
unique political situation at that time.
II.
Conversely, a similarly sensitive look at the episodes and practice of separation of powers in the colonies and states prior to the
adoption of the Constitution of 1787 might provide more reliable
historical information. Specifically, an examination of both Massachusetts history before the adoption of its Constitution of 1780 and
the text of that Constitution provides a useful counterweight to
the episodes Casper describes. Limiting one's focus to Massachusetts has, however, two unavoidable risks. First, Massachusetts
may be unrepresentative, particularly on a single issue, such as the
significance of the doctrine of separation of powers. The high degree of similarity between the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780
and the federal Constitution of 1787 reduces this risk, however.
Second, the Massachusetts Constitution may not offer direct comparison to doctrines implied in the federal Constitution. Although
this difficulty exists, it does not vitiate the comparison, because
not only was Massachusetts a very important state, but the timing
of and the individuals involved in the design of its Constitution
were significant.
A detailed knowledge of Massachusetts legal and political history from 1691 until the outbreak of the Revolution suggests that
political thinkers would have preferred and intended to adopt a
fairly strict and formal view of a notion of separated powers in the
1. Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30
WM. & MARY L. REv. 253 (1989).
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Constitution of 1780. The period from 1691 is the Provincial Period-the period of the second charter of the Massachusetts Bay
Colony.2 The Charter, in bold brush, provided for a royal governor,
an executive council, a popularly elected general court or assembly, 3 and courts. The Charter was a "mixed" constitution, combining royal, aristocratical, and popular elements, and it made no explicit reference to separation of powers.
The Provincial Period was characterized by tension and conflict
between the royal governors and the general court. This pervasive
tension does not shed direct light on the extent of Massachusetts'
attraction to notions of separated powers. A number of particular
incidents during this period, however, shed indirect light on the
separation of powers aspects of the Constitution of 1780 and perhaps on the larger American attitude toward separation issues.
Two episodes are illustrative: the dispute over the salaries of the
judiciary in the 1770s and the dispute over whether the Governor
could refuse to accept an executive councilor elected by the General Court. The episode involving judicial salary has been treated
thoroughly by Dean Barbara Aronstein Black of Columbia.4 In
sum, the Provincial Charter, consistent with contemporary English
practice, did not provide a life term, a guaranteed salary, or even
theoretical independence for judges. Judges were appointed by the
governor with the advice and consent of the council. 5 Their salaries
were appropriated by the legislature, which frequently was slow to
pay agreed salaries.
From roughly 1770 until 1774, a serious dispute existed between
the royal governor and the "popular" local faction that controlled
the house of representatives. The respective combatants were at
times unhappy with the judges, their rulings, their independence,
and royal appointees. In the midst of this ongoing dispute, however, a consensus developed that judges should be appointed for

2. See 3 F. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND
OTHER ORGANIC LAWS Op THE STATES, TERRITORIES AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE
1870 (1909). The colonists referred to the Massachusetts Bay Colony as the Province of Massachusetts Bay.
3. The Charter of Massachusetts of 1691, reprinted in id. at 1878.
4. Black, Massachusetts and the Judges: JudicialIndependence in Perspective,3 LAW &
HIST. REV. 101 (1985).
5. The Charter of Massachusetts of 1691, reprintedin 3 F. THORPE, supra note 2, at 1879.
FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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good behavior, that their salaries should not be politically vulnerable, and that they should not be easily subjected to control by government officials.' In particular, the legislature strongly resisted
the effort of the Crown to control such salaries. The original version of article XXX of the Declaration of Rights portion of the
Constitution of 1780, which was revised to endorse fully the idea of
separated powers, provided: "The judicial department of the state
ought to be separate from, and independent of, the legislative and
executive powers."'7 Article I of chapter III of the Frame of Government portion of the Constitution of 1780 provided also that
"[a]ll judicial officers,

...

shall hold their offices during good be-

havior." s Yet such judges could be removed by an address, a mechanism that generally did not require the commission of a high
crime or misdemeanor.9
A second episode of pre-Revolutionary history that helps illuminate separation of powers concepts involved the appointment of
governor's councilors and house speakers. Although fitting executive or governor's councils into a tripartite approach to separated
powers is difficult today, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780
provided for such a council 0 for several reasons. First, Massachusetts had a successful experience with a council during the Provincial Period. The council provided the general court some continuing power over the executive, namely, the royal governor, when the
general court was not in session. The council also gave the general
court a role in appointments powers that the Charter conferred on
the governor. Second, the council's existence formalized a pattern
of requiring the governor to confer with a group of senior officials
before acting.
The Charter of 1691 provided that the members of the council
had to be elected by the general court." On one occasion, the General Court elected a Boston physician, John Clark, who was identi6. Black, supra note 4, at 159-62.
7. J. ADAMS, Observationson the Reconstructionof Government in Massachusetts during

the Revolution, in 4

THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS

230 (1851).

8. Constitution or Form of Government for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts of 1780,
reprinted in 3 F. THORPE, supra note 2, at 1905.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1879.
11. Id. at 1882.
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fled with the "popular" or anti-royalist party. The Royal Governor
refused to "accept" him as a member of the council. 12 Immediately
thereafter, the General Court elected Clark as its Speaker. The
Royal Governor, Samuel Shute, sent the following message to the
House upon receiving notification of Clark's election: "I Accept the
Choice of John Clarke.... ." The House, in turn, replied icily that
it had informed the Governor "for Information only, and not Apthe Goverprobation."'" The Charter was later amended to require
4
nor's approbation as to the election of a speaker.'
The struggle over judicial independence and the election of John
Clark might demonstrate only the existence of ongoing royal-colonial tension. Yet both episodes shed light on the Constitution of
1780 and its generalizations about the separation of powers. Like
the federal Constitution, the Massachusetts Constitution assigned
each branch a denominate function, "executive," "legislative," or
"judicial," but the final version of article XXX of the Declaration
of Rights concluded:
In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or
either of them: the executive shall never exercise the legislative
and judicial powers, or either of them: the judicial shall never
exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them:
to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men. 15
This more explicit article replaced the original formulation of the
idea of separation of powers in the Constitution that had been limited to the judiciary.'"
III.
An early .incident involving the foreign relations and war powers,
such as the Algerine pirates episode, is unlikely to be a reliable
indication of the meaning to be ascribed to the generalities of the
12. See Osgood, John Clark, Esq., Justice of the Peace, 1667-1728, in LAW IN COLONIAL
1630-1800, at 110 (D. Coquillette ed. 1984).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Constitution or Form of Government for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts of
1780, reprintedin 3 F. THORPE, supra note 2, at 1893.
MASSACHUSetTS

16. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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doctrine of separation of powers. The primary reason for its unreliability was the fragile situation in which the former colonists felt
themselves in the immediate post-Revolutionary period. Fear of
Britain continued, distrust and later horror at France were not uncommon, and fear of internal fracture ran deep. It was a lonely and
frightening world for all of the leaders of the new Republic. That
Washington and Jefferson proceeded very cautiously and with full
congressional involvement regarding the blackmail undertaken by
the Ottoman satraps operating. on the Algerian coast should come
as no surprise.
There is a second reason why an incident involving the war powers is unlikely to be representative of the true meaning of separation of powers. Again, a look at the Massachusetts Constitution of
1780 is helpful. In a now repealed article VII of chapter II describing executive power, the governor was made "commander-in-chief
of the army and navy" with power to "assemble in martial array,
and put in warlike posture, the inhabitants" of the Commonwealth
and "to kill, slay, and destroy,... by all fitting ways, enterprises,
and means whatsoever, all and every" enemy. 17 Except for this
provision and one requiring that the general court confirm the existence of any rebellion, the Constitution of 1780 was silent on war
matters. This silence is improved only slightly in the federal Constitution of 1787-and that document's vagueness has led to a series of vexing and seemingly insoluble questions in recent years
about the power of the President vis-a-vis the Congress to direct
foreign relations in a situation short of a declared war.
That the text of the federal Constitution is vague should not be
puzzling. First, although the former colonists had just fought a
war, the major disputes between the royal governors and the colonies in the immediately preceding seventy years generally did not
revolve around war and peace issues because the Crown was
needed to protect the colonists militarily. Certain aspects of making war concerned the colonists and usually were incorporated in
provisions of constitutional documents, such as the grant of allinclusive power to the legislature to initiate and enact appropria-

17. Constitution or Form of Government for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts of
1780, reprinted in 3 F. THORPE, supra note 2, at 1901.
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tion and taxing measures.18 Also, soldiers could not be quartered
forcibly except in wartime pursuant to law or by consent of the
home owner. 19
A second reason why the division or sharing of the war and foreign relations powers was not specified in the text of the Constitution was the absence of any particularly strong episode in which
the Crown abused these powers during the seventeenth century.
The perceived abuses of Charles I were: (i) refusing to call a parliament, (ii) trying to levy taxes without authorizing legislation, (iii)
operating a set of courts that noxiously attempted to enforce conformity to the Anglican religious settlement, which was not universally popular, and (iv) surrounding himself with autocrats like
Archbishop Laud and sycophants like Buckingham.2" Charles I and
Charles II, and James I and II for that matter, were not identified
with abusing the war or foreign relations power. As a result, the
Constitution of 1787 did not address the separation aspects of the
war and foreign relations powers except through the generalities of
functional separation and the specific rules about sharing powers
such as the executive veto.
The crucial question, therefore, is whether much can be read
into the leanness of the text on war powers. In United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,2 Justice Sutherland suggested that
the President is really the successor of the British Crown. Casper's
essay implies that early practice suggests that full sharing and
equal participation occurred even in the foreign relations and war
powers areas. I am sure Dean Casper reflects early practice accurately, but I am unsure that this practice is a more convincing key
to the meaning of the text than Justice Sutherland's recourse to
first principles.
IV.
In summary, even if the facts Casper recounts are accurate and
complete, they do not elucidate separation of powers issues much.
The Constitution of 1787 represents a serious commitment to sepa-

18. Id. at 1892.

19. Id.

20. See generally 1, 2 C. HILL, REFORMATION
21. 299 U.S. 304, 316-29 (1936).

TO INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

(1967).
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rated powers while also specifying some obvious examples of sharing of powers. This commitment was not an abstraction but a function of the history and memory of the former colonists. As we
struggle with the questions of the validity of legislative vetoes, the
budget balancing act, and appointment of special prosecutors, we
must confront and continue to recognize this commitment.

